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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that information technology can have a significant impact 
on organizational flexibility. Information technology (IT) contributes to flexibility 
by 1) changing the nature of organization boundaries and the time at which work 
takes place and 2) altering the nature and pace of work. IT also has important 
second and third order impacts on organizations and industries. The paper presents 
examples to illustrate the impact of information technology on two industries and 
three companies. The paper concludes that management should consider the use of 
information technology to increase flexibility and should predict the higher order 
impact of their actions on the organization and their industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been estimated that over half of capital expenditures in the United 
States are devoted to technology, but there has been little concrete evidence to show 
that this investment has improved the effectiveness of organizations. What ways can 
information technology (IT) contribute to organizational effectiveness? One 
measure of effectivenss is flexibilty (Campbell 1977). 
What is organizational flexibility? For a manufacturing firm, Hall (1983) 
defines flexibility as meaning "that plants should be capable of switching quickly 
from one product to another, or from one part to another ... almost instantly." 
"Flexibility offers the capability to cope with environmental uncertainty (Swamidass 
and Newell, 1957)." "Flexibility enables the organization to adapt to current market 
realities and to react appropriately as market forces change over time (Severance 
and Passino, 1988). "Flexibility provides the means to achieve the ends of increased 
growth and resource acquisition (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983)" 
The authors wish to thank Professor John Turner for his comn~ents on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
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These definitions suggest that flexibility provides the organization with the 
ability to adapt to change and respond quickly to market forces and uncertainty in 
its environment. Flexibility should allow a firm to respond to competitors and take 
advantage of new opportunities. A flexibile organization is the opposite of a rigid 
bureaucracy. The purpose of this paper is 1) to illustrate the impact of information 
technology on organizational flexibility and 2) explore the implications of that 
impact for management. 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
Information Technology (IT) refers to hardware, software, procedures, 
personnel, and data employed in the production, dissemination, and utilization of 
information, both formal and informal, in an organization (Davis and Olson, 1985). 
While traditionally IT has been defined to include only "formal" information 
systems, such as reporting systems generated by a database, increasingly IT is 
utilized to facilitate informal interpersonal communication. The key technologies 
include computers, computer-controlled devices, and telecommunications networks; 
we also include electronic mail, teleconferencing, voice mail, and facsimile 
transmission as part of IT. 
IT consists not only of tangible pieces of equipment and programs; it 
represents the capacity of the organization to produce, disseminate, and digest 
information. IT has been used in a number of ways including the mechanization of 
information processing, the augmentation of knowledge work, and for supporting 
coordination in the organization. 
A significant amount of investment in IT is for basic mechanization of the 
records of production and distribution of goods and services (e.g., invoices) or the 
actions themselves (e.g, electronic money transfer). A centralized database makes it 
possible to produce and disseminate information for management control as a by- 
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product of mechanization. This category also includes technology used for 
manufacturing such as CAD/CAM and computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM). 
Information technology also contributes to the support of individual workers. 
Drucker (1964) identified "knowledge work as a specifically human activity, distinct 
from physical labor which could be automated. The notion of augmentation was 
first defined by Englebart (1963) as "increasing the capability of a man (sic) to 
approach a complex problem situation, gain comprehension to suit his particular 
needs, and to derive solutions to problems" (p. 1). Today, personal computers are 
used widely by individuals to augment knowledge work. 
Increasingly IT is being used to increase the ease of connection between 
individuals, organizational units, and even different organizations. Applications 
such as electronic mail, voice messaging, and facsimile transniission facilitate the 
communication and coordination of information required for organizational 
processing. Some terms used for this class of applications are: interpersonal 
computing (Goldberg, 1987), coordination technology (Holt, 1988; Malone, 1988), 
groupware (Richman, 1987a), and coniputer supported groups (Johansen, 1988). 
Information Technology and Flexibility 
We argue that information technology can make a major contribution to 
organizational flexibility. We do not claim that increased flexibility has been the 
case with every organization employing technology or that it will be in the future. 
Examples cited later in the paper provide evidence to support our primary 
contention that technology has the potential to dramatically impact organizational 
flexibility. 
How can IT contribute to adaptability and change? IT impacts flexibility in 
two major ways: 
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1. IT can alter the time and place of work, generally by changing boundaries 
on where tasks are accomplished and removing constraints on when tasks are 
performed. 
2. IT affects the nature and pace of work; most often it speeds up the 
processing of information. 
Communications technology helps remove the constraints of time and place 
in decision-making. Technology removes organizational boundaries by making it 
possible to communicate easily without having those involved in the same location. 
IT provides asynchronous communications so that the time of day and time zone are 
not a constraint when exchanging information. 
The ability to react quickly means that one can perform tasks rapidly in order 
to take advantage of new opportunities. Technology speeds the processing of 
information so that it can be used to make timely decisions. Technology is the 
"factory" for many financial services; speed and processing power is required to 
provide the service or product to the customer. IT can make it possible to 
reconfigure manufacturing lines quickly through flexible manufacturing systems. 
Figure 1 shows the contribution of IT to flexibility. By altering boundaries, 
removing time constraints and speeding the nature and pace of work, information 
technology helps to loosen organizations and reduce the rigidity inherent in many 
organizational structures. The contribution of technology to speed helps the 
organization respond quickly. Figure 1 shows how IT has the potential to increase 
organizational flexibility, to help organizations adapt and change to meet new 
demands on them. 
Flexibility for Whom? 
Information technology may increase flexibility for the firm developing it, but 
in many instances the benefits of increased flexibility accrue to customers or 
suppliers. The use of e-mail within the firm primarily benefits the organization 
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installing the system. However, extending the system to customers provides them 
with added flexibility. In financial services, building more processing power provides 
benefits for the developer who can generate more revenue, and it provides more 
flexibility for the customer who can react faster. 
Thus, the benefits of increased flexibility accrue to both the developer and 
related organizations and individuals like customers and suppliers. The flexibility of 
the developing firm may not be increased dramatically from some applications of 
technology, however the technology has increased flexibility for the industry 
involved. In the remainder of the paper, we discuss flexibility regardless of whether 
the greatest change affects the developer or others who interact with the developing 
organization. 
The Flexibility Paradox 
Cameron (1986) suggests that paradox characterizes the modern corporation 
when adapting to turbulent conditions. The difference between organizational and 
technological flexibility is one such paradox. Technology can contribute to 
organizational flexibility, but technology is often considered inflexible, itself. The 
technology that provides flexibility soon becomes old and hard to maintain so that 
the organization tends to become more inflexible over time. Many systems that 
provide flexibility are complex and difficult to modify. It took one airline over two 
years to track frequent flyer mileage in its reservations system; in the meantime 
passengers had to paste scannable labels on their ticket coupons to get mileage 
credit for a flight. 
Leading organizations deal with the paradox by changes and improvements 
in the technology, e.g. reservations systems undergo constant technological updating 
and change. Hopper (1990) argues that the movement toward very powerful, open 
systems will make it possible to implement and modify complex technology more 
easily in the future. 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of  Business 
Working Paper IS-92- 14 
Higher-order Effects 
It has been suggested that there are additional impacts beyond those 
intended from implementing technology (Malone et a1.,1987; Malone, 1988). In 
conducting research for this paper, we found a number of impacts which went 
beyond the original intentions of the firm implementing technology. These impacts 
may be positive or negative for different groups affected by the technology. 
For purposes of this paper, we define second-order effects as impacts on the 
organization implementing the technology beyond the immediate justification for 
the technology. For example, airline reservations systems were first justified on the 
need to improve the efficiency of the reservations process. A positive second-order 
impact was large improvements in customer service resulting from the systems. 
Third-order impacts affect the industry when a number of firms adopt a similar 
technology. The entire airline industry has been changed dramatically by 
computerized reservations systems. 
A further subdivision of higher-order impacts is helpful in understanding the 
impact of IT. Intended impacts are foreseen by the firm and industry. Unintended 
impacts are those not reasonably foreseen; sometimes the unintended impacts affect 
groups never considered when a system was designed. 
A TAX0NOR.N 
The discussion above suggest a taxonomy for viewing the impact of IT on 
organizational flexibility. The technology will haev a primary impact on boundaries 
and the time of work and on the nature and pace of work. As sugested by Malone, 
IT will also have second order impacts on the firm and third order impacts on the 
industry. These higher order impacts may be intended or unintended. 
The purpose of the taxonomy is to help understand the impact of technology 
on organizational flexibility and especially how this impact can extend beyond the 
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original purpose of a system. To provide evidence of this impact we discuss two 
industries and three companies in the next sections using the taxonomy: 
Primary impact 
Boundaries and time of work 
Nature and pace of work 
Second-order impacts on the firm 
Intended 
Unintended 
Third-order impacts on the industry 
Intended 
Unintended 
The assignment of impacts to different categories in the analysis below is 
based on our interpretation of published articles and statements from the 
developers of systems. Can we prove that no one in the airline industry in 1958 
foresaw the impact of a CRS on airline competition in 1991? If one examines 
publications about the motivation for developing reservations systems and studies 
their history (Hopper,l990), it is highly unlikely that this third-order impact was 
planned over thirty years ago when the SABRE system was being developed. This 
paper presents our interpretation of the evidence; we invite the reader to consider 
our conclusions carefully and critically before accepting them. 
Any study of impacts has to deal with the question of causality. We argue 
that information technology has had an impact on organizational flexibility, but we 
cannot prove that program trading works only because of stock exchange electronic 
order routing systems or computer programs that scan for arbitrage opportunities. 
It is possible that program traders wanting to buy or sell a basket of stocks could use 
preprinted trading tickets delivered with great speed to floor traders. Again, the 
analysis of technological impacts is based on our interpretation of the literature 
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reviewed for this paper and from personal experience. The reader is cautioned to 
consider other possible causal explanations for the data presented. 
THE IMPACT OF IT IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
Stage One 
American Airlines developed the first fully Computerized Reservations 
System (CRS) in 1961; the system was motivated by a need to handle increasing 
passenger loads and to provide better customer service (Copeland and McKenney, 
1985; Hopper, 1990). The airline's agents used the system to make reservations for 
passengers. For the first time, the airline could associate a passenger name with a 
reservation on a specific flight. 
As shown in Table 1, the first stage CRS removed the boundary created by 
the manual, partially centralized reservations process. Instead of allocating seats to 
offices for sale, an agent had information locally on all seats available. The 
boundaries around the reservations process moved from a central department to 
each distributed agent. The CRS created more flexibility for passengers as 
reservations could be made 24 hours per day. These reservations were made and 
confirmed instantaneously. 
Table 2 suggests that an intended second-order impact was better customer 
service. In addition, a positive, unintended impact of IT was the advantage that 
CRS airlines began to develop over their competitors. Since the industry had a 
small number of firms and the actions of each firm were highly visible in the market, 
other airlines began developing CRSs shortly after American. 
Table 3 describes possible third-order impacts of CRSs on the industry; 
clearly the systems improved inter-airline communications. They accomplished 
their purpose of allowing airlines to cope with the advent of jet travel and increased 
air traffic in general. A likely unintended impact of IT was the tendency of CRSs to 
Center for Digital Economy Research 
Stern School of Business 
Working Paper IS-92- 14 
become a barrier to entry. 'I'he need for a reservations system significantly raised 
the cost of entering the airline business at a time when government deregulation 
was on the horizon. 
St age Two 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s the airline industry talked of a single, 
cooperative reservations system that would be distributed to retail travel agents 
(Copeland and McKenney, 1988). In 1976 United and American Airlines began to 
market their systems to travel agents. 
Travel agents could now make airline reservations through a direct 
connection to the airline computer; they did not have to contact an airline 
reservations staff member by telephone. The first stage of CRS automation moved 
the reservations boundary to the airline's agent; the second stage moved it to the 
travel agent. See Table 1. 
As the systems matured; the airlines added the ability for the travel agent to 
provide boarding passes with tickets, eliminating the need for the passenger to wait 
in line for a seat assignment and boarding pass at the airport. The system moved 
part of the enplanement process from the airport to the travel agents' office, altering 
the boundaries of airport operations and speeding the boarding process for the 
passenger. Some agents began to offer 24 hour travel assistance for any cusromers 
who needed rerouting while on a trip. 
Retail automation altered the nature and pace of work for the travel agent as 
well; it took far less time to make a reservation for a customer. In addition, all of 
the CRS systems include ticket printers in the agents' office; significant gains in 
agent productivity were experienced as tickets were printed by the computer rather 
than by hand. These first-order impacts are summarized in Table 1. 
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An intended second-order impact of the agency CRSs was improved 
customer service and convenience. The airlines also hoped to become closer to 
travel agencies and earn their loyalty, or at least their business. 
As the systems matured, the airlines began to replace their "cohost" programs 
with charges for services. A likely unintended second-order impact of IT was the 
use of CRSs to generate non-flight revenue directly. The two major CRS vendors, 
American and United, began to charge other airlines for reservations made for 
them on Sabre or Apollo; the fees were $1.85 per leg ticketed. 
It was estimated that in 1985 Sabre earned $143 million on revenues of $336 
million and that it contributed more than $2 per share to American's earnings, about 
one third of American's total earnings and its highest margin business (Copeland 
and McKenney, 1988; Forbes, December 30,1985.) When AMR Corporation 
(American's parent) announced it would consider bids for selling shares in Sabre, 
Wall Street valued the system at $1.5 billion. At the time, AMR's market value was 
$2.9 indicating that Sabre had grown to slightly exceed American's core business in 
value (Clemons and Weber, 1990). 
Table 3 shows the third-order impacts of the technology on the airline 
industry. The CRS vendors, for the most part, developed exclusive arrangements 
with travel agents using their CRS. The airlines hoped to gain froill the halo effect, 
expecting their agents to be more likely to book a flight on the CRS vendor's airline 
than another when given a choice. 
A significant unintended impact on the industry was a dramatic barrier to 
entry once the reservation systems were in place in travel agencies. Donald Burr, 
founder of People Express, laid much of the blame for the demise of his airline to its 
inability to utilize CRS technology. 
Another unintended third-order impact of information technology has 
occurred on firm structure within the industry; the major airlines have created 
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subsidiaries from their reservations units. While United was a takeover target, it 
sold half share of its Covia CRS subsidiary to a consortium of European airlines and 
US Air for $500 million having invested an estimated $250 to $300 million. Before 
selling half of Covia to US Air, KLM Swissair and British Ainvays, United had 
already agreed to form an alliance with the European airlines to develop a system 
for European agency automation. Texas Air entered into a similar alliance with Air 
France, Lufthansa, Iberia and SAS. Given the problems with Texas Air, this alliance 
turned to American Airlines for assistance in 1990. The sale of part of the 
American Airlines Sabre system to Delta was recently disapproved by the 
government who feared the power of the combined systems. New organizational 
boundaries have been created (the CRS subsidiaries) and new strategic alliances 
formed as a result of reservations automation. 
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 
The securities industry has made major investments in information systems 
and services due to intensive information processing requirements. The securities 
industry consists of individual and institutional investors, brokerage and financial 
services firms and a group of exchanges. 
Automation in the securities industry has focused on individual systems 
designed for a specific purpose. With the exception of the exchanges, most 
securities systems have had their primary impact on the firm that developed the 
application. Exchange applications, of course, affect all of those who use a 
particular exchange. There are also national and international trading systems like 
the NASDAQ system (over-the-counter stocks) and Instinet, a computerized 
exchange owned by Reuters (Lucas and Schwartz, 1989a). 
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Back Office Systems 
Organizations adopted information technology first for processing large 
volumes of transactions. A brokerage firm must keep track of customers' accounts; 
the stock exchanges and clearing firms must clear all of the day's transactions. 
Large, back office computer systems help accomplish these tasks. These systems 
give firms the ability to process huge volumes of transactions and meet stringent 
time limits. 
Once a brokerage firm has information in a database about the customer, it 
can make that information available to the broker in a branch office to supplement 
the quotation information typically purchased from an outside vendor like Quotron. 
See Table 4. The technology removes boundaries on the availability of account 
information; it is now easily available at the broker's desk rather than from a bulky 
printout or through a phone call to a central processing site. 
Table 4 shows that the back office systems also contributed to extending the 
time for trading. In the 1960s, inadequate capacity led to early closings of the New 
York Stock Exchange so that securities firms could catch up on transactions 
processing; today systems are in place to eliminate this time constraint. The back 
office systems also accomplish one of their major objectives; they greatly speed the 
processing of customer trades. 
Table 5 describes the second-order effect of IT used for back office 
processing. An intended impact was improvements in customer service. A possibly 
unintended consequence is that these systems have generally made it easier to trade 
large blocks of stock. When we look at all of the firms in the industry together in 
Table 6, a third-order impact of IT is to allow a larger volume of trades at the 
exchanges, something desirable from the brokerage firms' and exchanges' 
standpoint. An unintended consequence of back office IT is a large increase in fixed 
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costs; at least two firms are considering combining their back offices, a first in the 
industry for two large, rival brokerages. 
Trading Systems 
Faced with steadily increasing volume and concerns about the ability to 
complete trades in sufficient time, major exchanges have undertaken different 
programs of automation. The NASDAQ system provides an electronic market for 
over-the-counter stocks for the U.S. and several foreign countries (Wall, 1989). 
Reuters handles about 30% of the world's foreign exchange transactions over its 
financial network (Clemons and Adams, 1989); its Instinet subsidiary offers an 
electronic market in a number of stocks (Reuters Case, 1988). 
The New York Stock Exchange has developed its SuperDot (Designated 
Order Turnaround System) to directly route orders to specialists, avoiding the floor 
broker; SuperDot is available for trades of up to 30,099 shares and limit orders of 
99,999 shares (Allen and Zarembo, 1989). 
The impact of information technology on flexibility of the trading system is 
dramatic. See Table 4. Brokers are able to route orders to the specialist on the 
exchange floor directly without using a floor broker, removing a boundary. 
Electronic exchanges make it possible to eliminate an exchange floor all together. 
IT has also been an enabler for 24 hour trading. Brokerage firms routinely 
"pass the book" on their foreign currency transactions from London to New York to 
Tokyo. One discount broker accepts phone trades all night and a computer user can 
send trades to a broker at any time. The trades are not executed until an exchange 
opens, but that is expected to change in the next few years. 
The ability of computer systems to process data at extremely high speeds also 
makes it possible to offer products that could not have been considered before 
computerization because of the time required to perform computations, e.g. 
calculating the stock distribution in an indexed fund. 
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A second-order effect of trading technology, shown in Table 5, has been to 
make new strategies like program trading possible; one has to be able to execute 
simultaneous buys and sells on different exchanges within two minutes (Wood, 
1989). It is likely that exchanges and firms wanted to encourage new trading 
strategies; it is not clear if the large amount of program trading was intended or not. 
The stock exchanges appear to be uneasy with these trades while the futures 
exchanges encourage them. 
Unintended third-order consequences of technology for the financial markets 
and the economy has a whole have been extensively debated since October 19, 1987 
and the near meltdown of the securities markets (Lucas and Schwartz, 19S9a). See 
Table 6. An intended impact has been to improve the efficiency of trading in 
general and to help the small customer obtain favorable execution of his or her 
orders. 
Has the technology unintentionally facilitated trading strategies which 
adversely affect liquidity and volatility? Was there insufficient processing capacity 
in October of 1987; did information technology provide more constraints than it 
removed? On October 19, 1987 one portfolio insurer sold $1.7 billion of assets 
while three other firms sold over $800 million each. Specialists and others bought 
$700 million; they could not meet the liquidity demands of modern technology 
(Wood, 1989). There has been some speculation that delays caused by insufficient 
systems capacity served to buffer the October crash; trades were delayed and price 
discovery was almost impossible at certain times during the day (New York Times, 
October 16, 1988). 
Since the crash, individual investors have largely been absent from the 
market (Leavitt, 1989). The individual investor may perceive that only large firms 
have the technology to provide the needed information for decision making and 
access to various exchanges in order to trade efficiently. One unintended third- 
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order consequence of information technology in the securities industry may be to 
drive the individual investor out of the market. 
THE IMPACT OF IT ON FLEXIBILITY IN THREE FIRMS 
The section above presents evidence for the impact of IT on organizational 
flexibility in two large industries. The analyis is at a high level of generality; in this 
section we discuss evidence based on three specific firms' use of IT. 
Discount Stores 
This organization is a large retailer of a complete line of goods from clothing 
to food to electric appliances. The company deals with over 900 suppliers of goods, 
servicing nearly 80,000 products. Purchasing must obtain accurate sales information 
from hundreds of stores; the company deals with a fixed set of suppliers, so the task 
of purchasing is highly structured. The primary information exchanged is price and 
delivery times. 
The company is experimenting with Electronic Data Interchange, or EDI. A 
primary objective of the technology is to reduce costs through reduced error rates. 
Since volume of sales in stores cannot be  predicted with accuracy, the company must 
also incur inventory carrying costs or risk loss of sales because of items out of stock. 
The solution to this problem is to use ED1 to help reduce the time from out-of-stock 
condition to replenishment from suppliers. 
Table 7 shows the expected first-order impact of this technology on Discount 
Stores; ED1 clearly reduces the organizational boundaries between Discount and its 
suppliers. Discount can also order at any time during the day. ED1 dramatically 
speeds ordering and should reduce stockouts. 
Table 8 describes the second-order impacts of ED1 on Discount Stores: here 
the intended impact is to create operating efficiencies. In addition to speeding 
order entry, the presence of ED1 should make it possible to operate the entire store 
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more efficiently; it is economical to order small quantities of merchandise and to 
maintain fewer items in stock. 
Table 8 suggests an unintended impact of ED1 on Discount Stores: the firm 
may lose some of its ability to negotiate prices with suppliers since it is so closely 
tied to them. In addition, having contract arrangements with a large number of 
suppliers may reduce the attractiveness of expansion through vertical integration. 
There may be less incentive for Discount stores to buy individual suppliers. 
Mrs. Fields' cookies2 
Mrs. Field's Cookies is a chain of small retail outlets, typically found in 
shopping malls, which sell several varieties of cookies and a few other selected food 
items. Currently there are approximately 500 retail stores world-wide. Stores follow 
a formula of consistent, uniform quality and price regardless of location. However, 
Mrs. Fields' Cookies has a unique organizational structure; except for a small 
middle layer of specialist advisors, the company has a completely flat structure with 
centralized control. Every shop is wholly-owned by the company rather than 
franchised, and the company is under the strong centralized control of Mrs. Fields 
and her husband. The unique organization of Mrs. Fields' Cookies allows the 
owners maximum flexibility in adapting its offerings to the changing tastes of 
customers in a "fad" business. 
IT is an integral part of the structure of Mrs. Fields' Cookies. Each store is 
connected on-line to a central database, and there is extensive mechanization of 
production quotas, sales volumes, etc. based on recent daily sales records for each 
store. In fact, each store is given hourly sales projections and reports hourly sales 
results. All ordering of supplies (e.g., chocolate chips) is done automatically from 
the central database with direct delivery to the store. 
2 The material in this section is adapted from (Richman, 1987b). 
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Flexibility in terms of product mix, sales quotas, even special promotions, is 
easily maintained across all stores worldwide. The company also uses IT for 
coordination; through voice mail and electronic mail, each store manager has direct 
personal interaction with Mrs. Fields herself. Company-wide announcements are 
frequently broadcast to each store by voice mail, significantly personalizing the 
announcement over memos and reports. Each manager may send Mrs. Fields 
electronic messages for particular problems and expect a personal response within 
forty-eight hours. 
As shown in Table 7, the first-order impact of technology at Mrs. Fields has 
been to reduce boundaries between stores and headquarters; the technology has 
created a fiat structure. It is also easy to communicate across time zones using voice 
and e-mail. The technology affects the nature and pace of work through detailed 
store operational control, freeing personnel for more sales work. 
Table 8 describes the second-order impacts of technology; as intended IT lets 
Mrs. Fields standardize quality across stores and products. Recently the firm has 
expanded rapidly straining its financial resources. Is it possible that one unintended 
result of technology has been to instill a sense of confidence that may be 
unjustified? Mrs. Fields technology does not necessarily apply to financing 
acquisitions or converting an acquisition to its business practices. 
East Coast High Tech 
This company is one of the leading US computer manufacturers and is well 
known for its highly matrixed organizational structure. The environment is 
turbulent and highly competitive; new advances in technology frequently cause 
competitors to change marketing and engineering plans radically. In addition, new 
product development times (after research and technology transfer) are typically 
two to three years. 
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The organization structure of East Coast High Tech can best be described as 
highly fluid. Reporting relationships change frequently and matrix relationships are 
common. Because of the environment and nature of the product, a structure which 
allows for coordination by lateral relations across all parts of the organization 
(except perhaps manufacturing) is required. However, the costs of maintaining such 
an organization are high and, as the number of parties requiring contact increases, 
the needed coordination becomes highly complex and time-consuming. 
One of the authors studied a sub-unit of East Coast High Tech which is 
responsible for defining new products in a segment of the market relatively new to 
the company, financial services. The sub-unit defines application requirements 
based on input from industry marketing and "sells" these requirements to 
engineering groups for development. Similar groups in the organization compete for 
scarce engineering resources based on their ability to convince management of the 
market for a proposed product. Frequently, multiple competing products are under 
development in different parts of the organization. Given the structure, there is no 
formal mechanism for coordinating multiple activities. Product groups can take it 
upon themselves to form coalitions to consolidate their resources on single rather 
than multiple products, or to use the knowledge gained from coalitions to 
differentiate and justify each product. 
The major IT for East Coast High Tech is an extensive data con~rnunications 
network which connects every part of the organization, across all functions world- 
wide. The network is primarily used for coordination through electronic mail and 
computer conferencing. The technology vastly increase the number of connections 
available to employees of the firm. 
Table 7 suggests that the technology at East Coast High Tech reduces 
geographic boundaries; work groups form despite the physical location of the 
participants. The technology lets groups or individuals communicate together at 
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one time or asynchronously. The end result should be faster communications and 
project completion. 
Table 8 suggests that an intended impact of technology is to increase the 
number and type of connections in the firm; IT also makes expertise available 
widely across the organization. A possible unintended consequence is to promote a 
fluid organization structure with minimal vertical authority; in this case, such a 
structure appears to be consistent with management's objectives. 
DISCUSSION 
The evidence presented above shows that information technology can have 
an impact on organizational flexibility; it has had an effect on the airline and 
securities industries and the three companies in the discussion. Technology has also 
had unintended higher order impacts in the examples. This section summarizes the 
evidence from the discussion of how IT affects boundaries and time of work and the 
nature and pace of work along with the higher order impacts of IT. 
Boundaries and Time of Work 
In the case of Discount Stores, Mrs. Fields Cookies and East Coast High 
Tech, comunications technology reduced organizational boundaries among 
customers and suppliers and within the firm. Communications technology has 
helped Mrs. Fields Cookies grow without a concornitant increase in the number of 
middle managers to process information. 
For the airlines industry, the time and place for making and processing 
reservations changed with a CRS. In the securities industry, brokers can bypass the 
floor trader; a broker can work in his or her office and route orders directly to the 
specialist on the exchange. 
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Nature and Pace of Work 
For Discount Stores technology has increased the speed of ordering allowing 
a reduction in safety stocks. Mrs. Fields can make immediate change to all stores 
through the computer programs each is provided for managing store activities. East 
Coast High Tech can coordinate its projects better and make faster progress on joint 
tasks through its use of communications technology. 
CRS have made travel agents far more productive than in the past. 
Technology has allowed dramatic increases in the volume of stock traded on the 
exchanges. 
Higher-Order Effects 
The examples also show IT can have higher-order intended and unintended 
consequences for the firm and industry. Second-order effects impact the firm 
developing a system. Discount Stores has improved its operating efficiencies while 
Mrs. Fields Cookies can standardize product and quality across stores. East Coast 
High Tech has increased the types of conections in the firm and made expertise 
more widely available, promoting a more fluid organizational structure. 
The airline CRSs have provided much better customer service and have 
given CRS vendors an advantage over the competition. In the securities industry, the 
technology has improved customer service to the extent that some customers with 
personal computers are able to submit trades directly to their brokerage firm (which 
may be a bank or other financial institution). IT has also facilitated new trading 
strategies especially those involving program trading and other forms of arbitrage 
Third-order impacts from IT affect an entire industry. Airline CRSs have 
raised barriers to entry for airline firms; they have created new organizational 
structures and alliances such as CRS subsidiaries and agreements with European 
carriers to develop CRSs. Some have argued that the flexibility provided by 
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electronic systems has had a destabilizing impact on the securities markets, 
particularly by contributing to increased volatility. 
IMPLICATIONS 
What are the implications from this analysis of the impact of IT on 
organizational flexibility? The evidence suggests that IT can have an impact on 
organizational flexibility. Flexibilty helps a firm react to the marketplace and to the 
actions of other firms. Flexibility can contribute to competitiveness, Organizations 
should design systems and use technology that increases their flexibility. Firms 
should also think about the higher order effects that technology can have to avoid 
negative unintended impacts. 
On an operational level, senior management must be involved in setting 
technology strategy, goals and implementation (e.g. Randy and Debbie Fields). 
Applications like e-mail, EDI, and voice mail require senior management to take a 
major role in implementation. Managers also need to be open to new ideas and the 
use of outside parties to build and integrate new technology (Hopper, 1990). 
One of the most difficult tasks for management is investing in building an 
infrastructure when there may be no immediate payoff (Vincent 1990). Yet, without 
an infrastructure the firm is not in a position to react quickly when an opportunity 
arises. An infrastructure is necessary to take advantage of the flexibility offered by 
technology. 
The unintended higher-order impacts of some systems may raise national 
policy concerns and be significant enough to impact the economy (e.g. securities 
trading systems). Managers and designers have a responsibility to anticipate the 
impact of their systems beyond the immediate objectives of the application. 
The designer of IT must consider the impact of the technology on the 
organization as well as on the particular task for which the technology is intended; 
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the IT designer also inevitably designs at least some parts of the organization. 
Management should consider information technology as a major variable in the 
design of the organization and think about how IT can contribute to effectiveness. 
Increasingly the design of organizations will involve specifying the type of 
information technology the organization needs to employ. For example, Hopper 
(1990) suggests that IT will change hierarchical organizational structures into 
networks of task forces and problem solvers. Technology can contribute to creating 
the organizational structure desired by management, and in some cases technology 
may be what makes a particular structure possible. 
One theme for the 1990s is competitiveness; organizational flexibility can 
contribute to competitiveness by helping the organization react more quickly to the 
marketplace and take advantage of new opportunities. One challenge for 
management in the 1990s is to take advantage of information technology to increase 
organizational flexibility. 
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First-Order Impact 
on Developing Firm 
Organization Boundaries Time Nature and Pace of Work 
CRS Stage 1 Remove boundary of Make reservat- Confirmed reservation made 
manual centralized ion any time instantaneously 
processing; make 
reservation at any 
location 
CRS Stage 2 Boundary for making Extra service Travel agent becomes more 
reservation shifts by agent, e.g. productive 
to agent from air- 24 hour assist- 
line; airport ance 
boarding pass moved 
to agency 
First-Order IT Impact 
From Airline Reservations Systems 
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First-Order Impact 
On Developing Firm 
organization Boundaries Time Nature and Pace of Work 
Securities firm Make data available Eliminate need Greatly speed processing of 
back office to brokers on-line to close trades 
exchanges early 
Trading at Able to route Movement toward Able to execute trading 
exchanges and orders without 24 hour trad- decisions instantaneously 
member firms intervention of ing; passing 
floor broker; the book around 
floor an extension the world for 
of the brokerage currency: NYC 
office; remove need to London to 
for floor, e.g. Tokyo 
NASDAQ, London Stock 
Exchange 
First-Order IT Impact 
On the Securities Industry 
Table 4 
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Second-Order Impact 
On Developing Firm 
Orsanization Intended Unintended 
Securities firm Improve customer service Facilitated trading large 
back office blocks of stocks 
Trading at Facilitate trading; enable Encouraged trading of baskets 
exchanges and new trading strategies of stocks and program trading 
member firms 
Second-Order IT Impact 
On the Securities Industry 
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